Keynes's Blind Spot: Consumption is Production Shared

Bret Stephens has written a nice opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal of December 23. He cites poet Rudyard Kipling and author George Melloan who wrote The Great Money Binge: Spending Our Way to Socialism.

Melloan's work, according to Stephens, shows "in exacting detail, not only how we came to our current crisis--thank you, Barney Frank, Chris Dodd, Alan Greenspan and Tom DeLay--but where [their flawed logic] is destined to take us again."

All four of these politicians--yes, Greenspan is one of them--seem to subscribe to Keynes's theory of what some have called "demand-side economics." This theory says that consumption is the answer to an economic bust cycle, and that it's okay to create the credit to pay for it through central-bank-created funny-money.

Stephens, citing Melloan I presume, and parodying Kipling, counters Keynes's theory using the supply-siders' argument:

"'[C]onsumption must be paid for with production" ... if you don't work (i.e. produce) you die (i.e., can't consume)."


[Thanks to Allposters.com for this image.]

Stephens and Melloan have understood the evils of Keynesian spending-for-prosperity, to be sure; but they have missed an essential point, which is this:

Consumption is purely a mechanism by which producers share among each other what they have already produced.

(See this post and the subsequent two posts for a more detailed example of this process.)

You see, production and consumption are two sides of the same coin, and production always comes first. One is given life by the other. Consumption cannot exist without production. We divide our production among ourselves on a global basis through the exchange among ourselves of small or large portions of what each of us has produced; and this action is called consumption.

We have gotten a distorted picture of this process, because often we see something we want and we think we have to work to procure the money to buy it. However, in reality the production of that thing came first, and the producers of that thing took their share of the product they produced by accepting a sort of warehouse receipt we have collectively come to label "money" instead of the produced thing itself. When we go to work, we simply become part of the exchanging group, much as a poker player buys chips to participate in the game.

Keynes obviously did not agree with this idea. He wrote as though he believed money has become a tool to be manipulated by politicians and their academic agents, as though it were a vague exchange medium representing nothing more than grease facilitating the performance of our monetary machine.

Like most people, Keynes also confused money (actual warehouse receipts, representing a share of production) with credit (a promise to repay a certain amount of warehouse receipts). Credit is not the warehouse receipt itself, but rather an expectation to receive warehouse receipt(s) within a specific timeframe, based upon the lender's faith that the creditor will hand over warehouse receipts in the short-term, when he or she has actually produced something and receives warehouse receipts as payment (or sells something he or she already owns).

Problems arise when credit promises are not fulfilled. For example, banks sometimes issue credit to market participants over and above producers' capacity to sell. Our current monetary system actually encourages banks to do so to an excessive degree, for reasons that I have treated elsewhere. (See this article, Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, for example.)

It is normal that at some point in every business cycle, banks will become overconfident and begin over-expanding credit by making bad loans. As a result, producers will manufacture (and sellers will purchase, stock, and try to sell) excess production. Under a healthy banking system, slower sales cause sellers' inventories to rise. As a result, they stop ordering, producers stop producing, and things return to their original equilibrium.

However, in an imbalanced banking system, credit starts to circulate, which means that buyers keep buying, profits keep rising, and sellers keep selling at higher and higher prices (too much money chasing too few goods). Producers receive increasing orders and on that basis get even more credit from the bank. They hire more workers, creating a misallocation of labor.

Then, with profits rising inordinately, a speculator instinct wakes up inside some otherwise normal businesspeople. These market players realize that instead of working, they can make lots of easy money borrowing credit, gambling on the stock market, betting on derivatives, playing the foreign-exchange gambit, or flipping real estate, i.e. making fast profits producing nothing.

Bad credit begets bad credit in an ever-climbing spiral. The boom game has begun, misallocating huge sums of what appears to be real money (warehouse receipts), but which in fact is only bad credit.

Then one of the sectors hits a snag. Very often it starts in the financial sphere when someone over-bets his credit. He can't pay; the bank calls his loan. His creditors don't get paid. When this mini-bust occurs, it infects other sectors that depend upon the flow of easy credit collateralized by real or imaginary profits.

Much misappropriated "wealth" just disappears into thin air, which is actually where it came from; but unfortunately ordinary people also suffer as producers of speculative production go bankrupt and misallocated workers lose their jobs.

Fearful people stop consuming until the bad credit is gone and equilibrium returns. This is the normal process, and if left alone it can take several painful months to wind itself down.

But Keynes and today's central bankers think they can outsmart the process. I can hear Keynes say, "Wait a minute. The warehouses are full and people are simply not buying. The wealth seems to be there, because production has already taken place. Somehow, the 'warehouse receipts' have been stashed, or misplaced, or destroyed by the bust mechanism, and all that is needed is for the central bank to prime the pump."

What he doesn't realize is that this Keynesian "solution" just creates more bad credit and throws it at consumers who--quite properly--just don't want to consume. This time, bad credit comes from both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in the form of zero-interest loans, "stimuli," government purchases of private companies like AIG, and bank bail-outs, which further misallocates money distribution away from the real economy (that can't absorb it) and towards the speculators who know how to play what has now become a funny-money political game. While this is going on, the serious participants in the economy are laying low with uncertainty, wondering what the Fed, the Treasury, plus the IRS, Congress, the EPA, and all the other alphabet agencies, will do next.

Kipling, Stephens, and Melloan seem to understand this game and have tried to call the politicians' bluff. But the politicians will ignore them, because they have found they can fool most of the people most of the time, and a few they can't fool can be bought.

And this game of Pied Piper goes around and around until the people take back control of their money. And they are doing so, through the purchase of gold, gold-related instruments, and other such store-of-value investments. Hopefully, they will not let the government take that right away from them.

Skidelsky: The Economic Pendulum Has Swung Again

In his commentary in today's Financial Times about the economic policy of government stimulus of the economy, Robert Skidelsky, the noted British author and authority on John Maynard Keynes, declares:

"What is fascinating is that it is an almost exact rerun of the debate between Keynes and the British Treasury in 1929-1930."


[Thanks to Thefoucaultproject.co.uk for the image.]

I have already posted about this earlier. He is right, we are right back where we started. In the 1930s Keynes argued against then-current classical economic theory, holding that government spending would put people back to work. At the time, few economists dared to refute his pronouncements. (One notable exception: Edward C. Harwood.)

But the classical school of economics wasn't dead yet. Spearheaded by Milton Friedman, it girded up its loins and made a comeback, using new geeky esoteric mathematical formulas that were effective in shooing the Keynesians. Today, we see the latter group charging forth again to reclaim their territory.

This swinging back and forth says nothing good about economics as a science, and more particularly macroeconomics. There have been no decisive victories in this field since its inception. This is a scary thought when you think that economists are running the show right now.

This unscientific outcome is typical of a number of the social sciences. As Skidelsky points out:

"It is characteristic of the social sciences that their battles are interminable, temporary defeats being followed by the regrouping of the defeated forces for a renewed assault."

I agree, with a nuance. He seems to be saying that the social sciences are ... well, just different kinds of science. He implies that the natural sciences are like a man: logical, Darwinian, forward-looking; and that the social sciences are more like a woman: emotional, spiteful, revengeful.

I think an endeavor is either a science, or it is not. Skidelsky errs in his designation as science the quixotic behavior of certain persons he calls "economists." They may be generally recognized as economists, but they are not scientists.

The debate then becomes: Is the term "economic science" an oxymoron?

This is a very good question, and perhaps THE fundamental question. There are two possible answers.

1. Either it is an oxymoron and economists should re-designate the field of inquiry as an art form; or

2. Economics can be a science, in which case the methodology has gone awry, given the "interminable, temporary defeats being followed by the regrouping of the defeated forces for a renewed assault", i.e. no progress is being made, the pendulum is merely swinging back and forth. In this case, optimists would hold that the methodology can be fixed.

In the early 1950s, a group of scientists formed a group called the Behavioral Research Council to study this very phenomenon in the social sciences. To make a long story short, they premised their foundation upon the hypothesis that the social sciences did have the potential to be just that, i.e. real sciences in the true meaning of the word; but that much gobbledygook must be lifted off the real science that did exist, in order for the various fields of endeavor to make any real progress.

They published two books:

- Useful Procedures of Inquiry, by E.C. Harwood and Rollo Handy, based upon specific dialogue on methodology between two fellows named Dewey and Bentley; and

- A Current Appraisal of the Behavioral Sciences, edited by the above two gentlemen and authored by various social scientists whose work the group respected.

The first is still pertinent to our discussion, pointing out the very flaws in the methods of research in fields like economics, to which Skidelsky makes oblique reference. Apparently, nothing has improved--a scary thought when you think that our economic future depends upon the work of good-intentioned people like Bernanke and his ilk, who believe in policy research that is unscientific in the judgment of a good portion of their own fellow economists.

The second is out of date but still of interest, because it gives the status of each social science as of the last printing. An update of this text would be useful someday.

I'll conclude this post by stating that my observations of human nature, and specifically of those who would call themselves economic scientists and those who would call themselves political scientists, point toward the conclusion that we have a long, long way to go before they start thinking of us and of their science, and not of themselves. Meantime, look what we have allowed them to do to us all.

PS: Keynes had the potential to be a true economic scientist, but I believe he was too enamored of his own glib persona to limit his mutterings to the truly useful, in the scientific sense of the word. Lawrence H. White, on the other hand, is one of the modern economists who counters this new policy swing back to Keynesianism. Read his latest piece over at Cato to learn a scientific economist's analysis of the Great Depression of 2007 and why the Keynesian stimulus idea can't and won't work in the long run.

Resuscitating Keynes: Oh No, Not Again

Dr. John Maynard Keynes must get tired of being dug up over and over again by economists looking for a mentor in times of crisis.


[Thanks to "Return of the Living Dead" for the image.]

I must say, his mistaken formulas sure do have staying power.

Dr. Martin Wolf, writing today in the Financial Times, goes digging again; but it's useless. Why? Because we are not all Keynesians now, even if a US president and Milton Friedman once said we were, probably in a moment of frustration.

In fact, the opposite is true: Keynes's unfounded notions of pushing on a string will subject us all to its deleterious effects today, just it did our ancestors back in the 1930s.

Bailouts, debt financing, government spending, inflating the money supply to save debtors and attempt the futility of restoring failing demand--all have been tried, and all have done much more harm than good.

No, Dr. Keynes did not teach us the following "three broad lessons" in spite of what Dr. Wolf says:

Non-Lesson No. 1

"... [Keynes believed] we should not take the pretensions of financiers seriously. ... Not for him, then, was the notion of 'efficient markets.'"

This is a non sequitur if I've ever seen one. Keynes may have been cynical about bankers; but I bet he'd love to rise from the dead to confirm that he always believed in efficient markets. Where does Wolf get the connection?

Non-Lesson No. 2

"The economy cannot be analysed in the same way as an individual business. For an individual company, it makes sense to cut costs. If the world tries to do so, it will merely shrink demand. An individual may not spend all his income. But the world must do so."

Wolf talks of "the world" as if we were all parts of one entity acting in concert. In fact, each nation is acting as an individual; and each nation's government should act as an individual, i.e. should cut costs, indeed must cut costs when the money is no longer there to pay for them.

A government can only spend money it doesn't have in three ways: borrow it, confiscate it through taxes, or create it. Because we are already a debtor nation we should not do the first; the second will exacerbate the current shortage of discretionary income; and the third will eventually cause the dollar to collapse, thereby leading up to the confiscation of all dollar-holders' purchasing power--not something to do when foreigners hold a good chunk of your debt.

Of course demand is shrinking. You may not have noticed, but the bubble has burst. The demand we once had was a mirage. And you can't revive a nation's economic demand by stuffing it with borrowed or artificial money like the foie gras of some goose--or rather, you can, but it won't work because this goose is dead. You'll get nothing to show for your efforts except a bag of ruffled feathers.

And Dr. Wolf is forgetting that it is not for lack of will that we or our governments cannot "spend all our income." It is the "income" that simply isn't there, unless we attempt to fabricate it out of more monetary helium, which is how we got the bubble in the first place. (See my article, plus page 2 and 3 linked on my blog, for my view on how this happened.)

Non-Lesson No. 3

Now, this is the one that really gets my blood boiling, so I'm going to have to breathe deeply as I punch my keyboard.

"In the 1930s, two opposing ideological visions were on offer: the Austrian; and the socialist. The Austrians--Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek--argued that a purging of the excesses of the 1920s was required. Socialists argued that socialism needed to replace failed capitalism, outright. These views were grounded in alternative secular religions [my italics]: the former in the view that individual self-seeking behaviour guaranteed a stable economic order; the latter in the idea that the identical motivation could lead only to exploitation, instability and crisis."

I don't have enough room here to analyze the error in Wolf's statements about the Austrians, but I'll say that the Austrian view of the 1920s is shared by more than one empiricist. I'll just name one: Edward C. Harwood of the American Institute for Economic Research.

To call the Austrians a "secular religion" may have a scrap of truth to it; but that doesn't mean they are wrong about their analysis of the 1920s. Dr. Wolf's criticism is more a statement about their description of their own methodology, rather than their theories; and in fact, the Austrians are quite empirical in their methodology in spite of themselves.

Even if they weren't, the Doctor mustn't throw out the baby.

More erroneous statements

Both Wolf and Keynes continue to err with the following affirmations:

- "[Keynes recognized] that the minimum state was unacceptable to a democratic society with an organised economy." Nothing could be further from the truth. Such a minimum state is unacceptable only to those who claim humans have the capability of organizing such a society's economy, which we can't, to wit our present mess.

- "Keynes would have insisted that ... [m]arkets are neither infallible nor dispensable. ... [T]hey can also go seriously awry and so must be managed with care." Keynes may indeed have so insisted; but no one has yet proven that humans can manage markets, in fact quite the contrary; the more we try to macromanage them, the more markets rebel.

- "The election of Mr. Obama surely reflects a desire for just such pragmatism." The election reflects no such thing. It reflects a slight majority's secular-religious belief in the spread-the-wealth Obama-Messiah, and/or shows an aversion to Bush and anyone like him.

- "The shorter-term challenge is to sustain aggregate demand, as Keynes would have recommended." You cannot sustain what doesn't exist. You can try to recreate it; but you will fail, just as Roosevelt did back in the 1930s. (See "pushing the string," above.) Roosevelt, with Keynes's encouragement, began the monetary inflating that is the scourge of the fiat-money 20th Century.

- "Also important will be direct central-bank finance of borrowers." This is a good way to transfer solvency problems from the private sector to the taxpayer; nothing more, nothing less.

- "A debt-for-equity swap is surely going to be necessary." Bailouts for special interests; nothing more, nothing less--and one of those special interests is politicians themselves, because it reinforces the electorate's belief in the politicians' capacity to "do something about it."

And on and on the good Doctor goes, making one Keynesian mistake after another.

Wolf finishes with a most sappy and hubristic "We must do better. We can do so, provided we approach the task in a spirit of humility and pragmatism, shorn of ideological blinkers."

Oh, gag me with a spoon. Who is the secular-religious one now?

Keynesian economists lack an understanding of simple market dynamics, and of how far the world has distanced itself from them. To blame the free market for 1929 or for our current turmoil is like blaming a train wreck on the train itself, instead of on the inebriated engineer.

Seeing the Humor in Obama's Bold New Economic Recovery Plan

Couldn't resist this one after reading about Obama's bold new economic plan.


[Click on the photo for a larger version.]

The Ghost of Times Past. The New Deal all over again. I guess we never learn.

In other news today, I read some interesting figures in an article by Martin D. Weiss, Ph.D. Although I'm not sure I can agree with his advice (he says we should all sell everything and buy Treasuries, keeping the faith that the dollar will maintain its credibility through this crisis), he points out this:

"By mid-year 2008, there were $52 trillion in interest-bearing debts in the United States, including mortgage loans, credit cards, corporate debt, municipal debt and federal debt; the federal government needed about $50 trillion for Social Security, Medicare and other commitments kicking in at a quickening pace; and U.S. commercial banks held another $182.1 trillion in side bets called “derivatives.” Grand total in the U.S. alone: $282 trillion. The numbers are not directly comparable, but just to give you a sense of the magnitude of the problem, that’s 402 times more than the $700 billion bailout package."

These are some pretty astounding figures.

(There's another fellow, Michael Hodges, who gives some great charts and data and whose horn I have been tooting for years now. See his wonderfully informative website.)

The rest of Weiss's article makes a lot of sense and even seems to point to the fact that the dollar is in great danger. But then he gives his recommendations to remain in dollar-denominated instruments.

If there is danger of a flight from the dollar and other paper currencies, as he warns Congress, isn't gold the only thing left?

For more about his warning, read the white paper he submitted to Congress on 9/25/08 (corrected 10/1/08) and other papers he links to therein.

Listen to the Wiser Tanks, Bernanke

We're now getting inflation-hawk, strong-dollar talk from the front-line think tanks. It's time for the Federal Reserve to wake up.


[Thanks to the Minneapolisfed.org, strangely enough, for the image. They've missed the most vital strong points and weaknesses of a strong dollar.]

Steve Hanke at Cato talks about the Fed's poor record, and John Chapman at the American Enterprise Institute gives his opinion in the Wall Street Journal about the Phillips Curve's long-term invalidity.

But is the Fed listening?

No, because they seem to be going along with the idea that a strong dollar is not in our interest (in spite of what government officials say in public).

Keynes is back, at least at the Fed.